Accident Compensation: The Role of Incentives, Consumer Choice and Competition by Evans, Lewis & Quigley, Neil
  423 
ACCIDENT COMPENSATION: THE 
ROLE OF INCENTIVES, CONSUMER 
CHOICE AND COMPETITION 
Lewis Evans* and Neil Quigley** 
In the 1990s, the insurance aspect, as opposed to the social welfare or more communitarian face of 
the Accident Compensation was prominent in public debate.  In this paper, Professors Evans and 
Quigley argue that Accident Compensation is indeed more appropriately seen as an insurance 
scheme. As such they question the appropriateness of state monopoly provision, believing that 
competition would give both employers and workers greater choice. 
I INTRODUCTION 
With the exception of the introduction of experience-rated premiums, the incorporation of the 
term "insurance" in the title of the 1992 legislation,1 and the short-lived reforms to the structure of 
workplace accident compensation in 1998, New Zealand's accident compensation scheme has 
continued to adhere to the principles laid down in the Woodhouse Report.2  In particular, public 
monopoly provision, comprehensive coverage and mandatory purchase, separation from other 
segments of the market for personal risk (where private insurance companies operate) and cross-
subsidies between different categories of insured risk were explicit components of Woodhouse's 
conception of the scheme.  Retention of these aspects of the scheme has been justified by the claim 
that accident compensation is a component of the social welfare net rather than an insurance scheme 
  
*  Professor of Economics, Victoria University of Wellington and Executive Director of the New Zealand 
Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation. 
**  Professor of Economics and Pro-Vice Chancellor (International) Victoria University of Wellington.  We 
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1  Accident Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992. 
2  New Zealand Royal Commission of Inquiry into Compensation for Personal Injury Compensation for 
Personal Injury in New Zealand: Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry (Government Printer, 
Wellington, 1967) [Woodhouse Report]. 
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and that the social welfare approach is superior from the point of view of those covered by the 
scheme.  
This paper reviews three of the economic issues raised by the structure of our accident 
compensation scheme: the role of incentives, the relationship with the broader insurance market and 
the costs of government monopoly provision.  We use our analysis of these issues to consider the 
veracity of the claim that potential accident victims in New Zealand benefit from our adherence to 
the principles laid out by the Woodhouse Report.  We conclude that the current structure of our 
scheme creates perverse incentives that substantially reduce its efficiency while also denying those 
covered by the scheme the potential benefits that would come from consumer choice among 
competing providers offering a broader range of risk products. 
II INSURANCE  
The Woodhouse Report treats accidents as exogenous events: that is, it views the frequency of 
accidents as independent of the incentives facing workers and employers.  Consequently, it argues 
that meeting the costs of accidents is a social responsibility not a matter for which individuals or 
employers should be required to obtain private insurance.  For example, the Woodhouse Report 
describes the fundamental principle of community responsibility around which its recommendations 
are built:3 
Just as a modern society benefits from the productive work of its citizens, so should society accept 
responsibility for those willing to work but prevented from doing so by physical incapacity.  And, since 
we all persist in following community activities, which year by year exact a predictable and inevitable 
price in bodily injury, so should we all share in sustaining those who become the random but statistically 
necessary victims.  
However, community responsibility is not a principle on which accident compensation must be 
built because accidents satisfy all of the important criteria required for the creation of a private 
insurance market: 
• Accidents represent an insurable risk because they are more predictable in a large sample 
of the population than they are for any individual; 
• The frequency and value of claims on the accident compensation scheme are affected by 
the incentives for investment in prevention and safety, as well as by the incentives of 
claimants and medical professionals to classify illness as resulting from an accident; 
• The accident compensation scheme can be described in an insurance contract; and 
• It is possible for multiple private insurers to provide the service, that is, there is no market 
failure which requires monopoly public sector provision. 
  
3  Woodhouse Report, above, 40. 
 
 ACCIDENT COMPENSATION: THE ROLE OF INCENTIVES, CONSUMER CHOICE AND COMPETITION 425 
Those who doubt the validity of these arguments need only look to the extensive evidence of 
successful private provision of workplace accident compensation in Australia and the United States 
for confirmation that monopoly public provision is unnecessary.4 
Since accident insurance of the type provided by the New Zealand scheme forms part of the 
broader market for the insurance of personal risk, mandatory separation of accident insurance will 
raise the cost of obtaining personal risk insurance in certain circumstances.  In particular, if there are 
economies of scope in the insurance of different types of personal risk, either because of common 
elements in the risk or common elements in the cover and benefits payable, then integration of 
accident risk into the broader insurance market will reduce the costs of insurance.  In addition, the 
purchase of multiple lines of insurance from separate insurers increases transaction costs.  This is 
particularly true when private insurance policies such as health and income protection have to be 
designed to complement the cover provided by ACC when it could instead be integrated into a 
single policy.  Thus, the cost of providing insurance is reduced where cover for a range of different 
risks is provided by a single insurer, and in a competitive market these cost savings will be passed 
on to consumers. Consequently, consumers are made worse off by separation of accident insurance 
from the broader insurance market, and by provision of the insurance through a monopoly state 
supplier with no power to extend higher levels of, or other types of, insurance. 
III INCENTIVES  
The incentives created by the existence of a no-fault, compulsory accident compensation scheme 
impact on the decisions made by both the insured parties and the insurer.  The efficiency of the 
incentives associated with the scheme will have a major impact on the costs of providing the 
insurance and the benefits obtained by insured parties.   
All insurance contracts create "moral hazard".5  In respect of accident insurance, moral hazard 
arises from the fact that insurance reduces the incentives of the insured party to avoid the 
contingency insured against, and increases the incentives of the insured party to claim that an 
accident occurred when it did not.  Moral hazard is reduced the higher is the co-insurance (share of 
the cost of the accident that is carried by the insured party). 
  
4  See for example, Amy Finkelstein The Interaction of Partial Public Insurance Programs and Residual 
Private Insurance Markets: Evidence from the United States Medicare Program (National Bureau of 
Economic Research Working Paper Series, number 9031, 2002) and also Munich Re Group Workers 
Compensation: Analysis of Private and Public Schemes (Munich Re Group, Munich, 2001) available at 
<http://www.munichre.com>. 
5  In the insurance literature moral hazard refers to the tendency of people with insurance to reduce the care 
that they take to avoid the contingency insured against.  In the economics literature moral hazard is used in a 
consistent but broader way, and refers to all post-contractual opportunism by one of the parties to the 
contract. 
  
426 (2003) 34 VUWLR 
A The Incentives of the Self-Employed 
An example of the impact of moral hazard is provided by the fact that self-employed workers 
have fewer accidents (see Table 1).   
TABLE 1: INJURY PER 100,000 WORKERS – SELF EMPLOYED VERSUS 
EMPLOYED (2000/2001)  
 Agriculture Manufacturing Construction Transport 
Self-Employed 13,036 5,462 3,623 1,665 
Employed 16,772 17,127 6,322 13,488 
% Difference 28.7% 213.6% 74.5% 710.1% 
Source: Accident Compensation Corporation 
Recent European research (detailed in Table 2 below) confirms that overall there is a tendency 
for self-employed individuals to recuperate quicker than their employed counterparts, which in turn 
confirms the presence of the incentives for self-employed workers to internalise the costs of injuries.   
TABLE 2: AVERAGE NUMBER OF DAYS ABSENCE OVER LAST 12 
MONTHS 
Reason for Absence All Workers Self-Employed 
Workers 
Difference 
Occupational Accidents 1.26 0.76 65.8% 
Work-related health problems 1.80 0.86 109.3% 
Non work related health problems 4.2 2.24 87.5% 
Source:  Pascal Paoli and Damien Merllie Third European Survey on Working Conditions 2000. 
There are a number of potential explanations for these figures, but all point towards perverse-
incentives created by accident compensation insurance.  The higher accident rate for employees may 
result from the fact that the greater compensation and preferential health benefits received via ACC6 
provide employees with incentives to claim all injuries as accidents regardless of their actual cause.  
However this explanation should apply to both employees and self-employed persons.  Another 
  
6  Treatment within the New Zealand health system is budget constrained and provided on a 'needs assessed' 
basis, as opposed to treatment within the ACC system, which is not budget constrained and based on an 
entitlement basis.  Thus, typically an injured individual is likely to receive quicker treatment when claims 
are made via ACC, as opposed to the traditional health system.  (Source: Ministry of Health). 
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possibility is that there are genuinely more accidents involving employees, in which case 
employment environments for employed individuals are significantly less safe than those of their 
self-employed counterparts, or the more accident prone members of society self-select away from 
self-employment.   Finally, but perhaps most importantly, the opportunity cost of being off work is 
much higher for a self-employed person than it is for an employee.   The incentives resulting from 
the opportunity cost of time off work would explain not only the low accident rates among self-
employed, but also the relatively low accident rates among high income earners.  
B The Asymmetry Between Sickness and Accident Benefits  
Another example of inefficient incentives is the asymmetry between benefits for victims of 
illness and accident.  Consider the example of a single 30 year old without children.  If they suffer 
illness as a result of a gradual process, such as multiple sclerosis, and it results in them being unable 
to work 15 hours or more per week for a period of at least two years, they may be eligible for an 
invalid's benefit.7  This entitles them to $196.70 per week.8  Alternatively, if the same person suffers 
from a temporary illness, such as glandular fever for a period of less than two years, they may be 
eligible for a sickness benefit9, which entitles them to $157.37 per week.10  Now consider the 
situation of the same person who is injured due to an accident, and is unable to work as a 
consequence.  Weekly compensation for personal injury under the Act entitles the accident victim to 
80 per cent of their pre-injury earnings.  The average weekly wages and salaries earned in New 
Zealand were $573 per week before tax for the year ended 30 June 2001.11  After deducting tax, 
compensation provided to the average New Zealander under ACC would be $369 per week.  This 
equates to a 87.6 per cent increase on the amount received under an invalid's benefit and a 134.5 per 
cent increase on the amount received under a sickness benefit. 
The asymmetry between sickness and accident benefits provides strong incentives to claim that 
any disability resulted from an accident.  An example of how the incentives affect providers is 
shown by Figure 1 below.  This purports to show that between 1992 and 1994 there was a dramatic 
(17.2 per cent) increase in the number of non-fatal injuries in New Zealand.  This increase is, 
however, not due to an increase in the number of accidents: it can be explained by changes in 
institutional arrangements and their impact on incentives.  The purchasing arrangements for ACC 
  
7  Provided for under the Social Security Act 1964, s 40. 
8  For entitlements, see Work and Income New Zealand Invalids Benefit (Work and Income New Zealand, 
Wellington, 2002) available at <http://www.winz.govt.nz/get_financial_assistance/benefits/ 
main_benefits/invalids_benefit.html>. 
9  Provided for under the Social Security Act 1964, s 54. 
10  Work and Income New Zealand, above 
11  Statistics New Zealand Statistics New Zealand Household Economic Survey Year Ended 30 June 2001 
(Statistics New Zealand, Wellington, 2001). 
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Figure 1 
Injury (Fatal and Non-Fatal) per 100,000 Persons in New Zealand 1988 - 1998 
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changed away from block funding to funding per accident reported.  These institutional changes 
created an incentive for health providers to report more accidents or to code more accident causes. 
C Consumer Choice 
New Zealand's ACC scheme is not voluntary: it provides for compulsory purchase of a standard 
policy.  Consequently, this scheme rules out consumer choice.  Indeed, consumer choice is so 
comprehensively excluded from the scheme that consumers are not permitted even to make choices 
about the level of insurance above a minimum required level of cover. In this section we explore the 
implications of the absence of consumer choice in the ACC scheme. 
D The "Adequacy" of Entitlements  
In the event of a personal injury, which results in the claimant being "incapacitated" in that they 
are unable to engage in employment, in which they were employed before the personal injury 
occurred,12 the Act entitles the claimant to weekly compensation of 80 per cent of their pre-injury 
earnings.  The Act and its accompanying regulations also provide for contributions to further 
 
  
12  "Incapacity" in terms of the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2001 is defined in s 
103(2).   
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ancillary expenses in certain circumstances.  Emergency care and ambulance care are paid in full by 
ACC.13  ACC will pay for acute public hospital admissions or non-urgent surgery, unless the 
claimant chooses a private provider who does not have a contract with ACC.  ACC may also 
contribute towards the costs of visits by the claimant to his or her treatment provider and may 
contribute towards part of the fee for common types of treatment.  Allowance is also made for 
contribution towards transport costs in certain specified circumstances, set out in the regulations to 
the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2001.  The patient must be travelling a 
specified distance within a specified timeframe, or spending a certain amount on public transport per 
month in order to reach the nearest treatment provider.  In such circumstances, ACC will pay a 
maximum of 28 cents per kilometre, if travelling by private motor vehicle, or the public transport 
fare. 
Whether these benefits are considered "adequate" will depend very much on the propensity of 
each individual to bear the risk associated with the costs that are not covered by ACC.  A single 
person with no mortgage might find 80 per cent of their pre-accident salary provides an adequate 
income during the period that they cannot work, but a family with children and a mortgage may 
much less easily absorb the 20 per cent reduction in post-accident income.  In a market that 
provided choice to consumers, it would be possible for consumers to choose whether to insure 80 
per cent or 90 per cent of their pre-accident income, and pay a premium commensurate with the 
level of cover that they chose.  Similarly, the adequacy of the benefits will depend on whether the 
person suffering the accident expected to receive substantial salary increases in the near future, or 
was at a point of their career where they expected no salary increases or perhaps even to be made 
redundant. 
The union movement regularly offers examples of situations in which the ACC benefits were 
manifestly inadequate to meet the costs necessarily associated with the treatment and rehabilitation 
of a person who suffered a workplace accident.14  Their approach is to argue that benefits and 
coverage should be increased across the board to resolve these problems of inadequate cover.  This 
"all or nothing" solution is inappropriate precisely because some workers no doubt have a 
propensity to bear risk consistent with the current scheme, and would rather have higher wages 
rather than the higher ACC benefits suggested by union representatives.  In addition, claims for 
higher benefits rarely take into account the fact that they will result in an increase in the moral 
hazard problems associated with the scheme by reducing co-insurance levels and thus giving some 
workers stronger incentives to report accidents and weaker incentives to avoid accidents.  Better, in 
our view, would be a scheme that required a minimum level of coverage to be purchased but 
allowed consumer choice beyond that.  This would mean that: 
  
13  However, ACC will not foot the bill for an ambulance trip, if the claimant is dead on arrival. 
14  See Ross Wilson "1990s – Decade of Change" (2003) 34 VUWLR 387. 
  
430 (2003) 34 VUWLR 
• Unions could negotiate higher levels of coverage, or coverage for events not required 
under the compulsory scheme, as part of their negotiations with the employer. 
• Individuals could obtain higher levels of cover than the compulsory or collective contract 
provided if they wished to do so.  
IV COMPETITION 
A Decentralisation, Incentives and Choice 
The ACC is a statutory monopoly provider of accident compensation insurance in New Zealand.  
A State monopoly is the ultimate form of centralised decision making.  If decision-making were 
decentralised, there would be more focus on consumers being provided what they actually 
demanded because this is the basis upon which providers compete for market share.  Suppliers 
would also be free to produce the mix of services they wanted to.  In an environment with 
decentralised decision-making, both incentives and the discipline provided by competitive tension 
must be present.  This would provide to consumers a menu of choices regarding their risk-based 
premiums and the extent of their cover.  For example, in a private market insurance cover for illness 
or accident and insurance against income protection would be intrinsically linked, not separate as 
under ACC, and the choice of co-insurance level would be used to determine the premium that 
should be paid. 15 
The provision of a menu of insurance options is in marked contrast to the absence of consumer 
choice associated with social welfare. The absence of choice in social welfare schemes follows from 
the fact that they are designed to provide social cohesion by setting minimum income levels for all 
members of society.  They are explicitly not designed either to ensure against specific contingencies 
(it is the absence of adequate income for subsistence that is the trigger for a social welfare payment) 
or to provide adequate compensation for cost incurred or income foregone. Further, social welfare 
schemes financed from general taxation revenue have no feasible means of allowing members of 
society to choose higher compensation levels and pay higher taxes as a result: there is no necessary 
relation between taxes paid and expected benefits from social welfare schemes in any event.   
B Time Inconsistency and Government Provision 
The major problem with public monopoly provision of ACC is that it cannot be time consistent 
because no government can bind future governments.  Thus, while full funding of claims is an 
  
15  We note that the ACC has recently begun to offer self-employed persons a choice between the standard 
cover and a higher level of cover (at a higher premium).  This provides just one example of the wide range 
of options that would become available to consumers if ACC or private insurers faced competitive pressure 
to meet the needs of consumers.  However, the involvement of ACC does not solve the problem that the 
cover applies only to accidents rather than all causes.  ACC involvement also raises concerns about the 
pricing of the cover given that ACC’s power to levy premiums for the compulsory cover does provide it 
with the potential to cross-subsidise different lines of business. 
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ongoing regulatory requirement of all private insurers, governments always have the option of 
looting a fully-funded scheme (for example, by declaring a contribution holiday).  Similarly, 
governments may change entitlements even for existing beneficiaries, though this would constitute a 
breach of contract for a private insurer.  
Charles Wilson16 provided support for the idea that government intervention in insurance would 
be Pareto improving in a situation where there was a pooling equilibrium with adverse selection in 
the private market.  Wilson showed that by providing the pooling policy as a compulsory publicly 
run scheme, and allowing individuals to purchase supplementary insurance in the private market, 
there will always be a Pareto improvement.  This theory however rests on the assumption that 
individuals can only purchase one insurance policy in the private market.  Amy Finkelstein 
considers this point and concludes that:17 
The government's capacity for affecting [a] Pareto improvement stems not from its unique capacity to 
compel participation in an insurance program, but merely from its introduction of the potential for 
individuals to hold multiple insurance policies.  Once individuals are allowed to hold multiple private 
insurance policies, the private market equilibrium will always be second-best Pareto efficient and 
government intervention therefore cannot be efficiency-enhancing. 
This analysis supports the conclusion of this paper; government intervention in the insurance 
industry via the ACC scheme results in a loss of consumer and producer welfare that would be 
otherwise available in the private market. 
The competing provider model requires the insurance cover to be specified as a contract and 
claimants could sue the provider for non-delivery of appropriate services.  Claimants under this 
model would have an incentive to monitor their provider and it would also be more time consistent 
than the current situation (it is more difficult to breach a contract than it is to change legislation).  
There are numerous options to solve the problems of a state monopoly provider.   
C Competition with Multiple State-Owned Providers 
An option for those opposed to private ownership is to establish multiple state-owned providers 
to compete against each other creating a competitive market while still in government ownership.  
Some of the benefits of this model include that the providers would behave as full cover insurers 
and they would be free to respond to consumer demand and facilitate consumer choice.  The 
legislation could also specify a minimum insurance cover, not a maximum.  Advantages of a 
competing State-owned Enterprise (SOE) model are: 
  
16  Charles Wilson "A Model of Insurance Markets with Incomplete Information" (1977) 16 Journal of 
Economic Theory 167. 
17  Amy Finkelstein When can Partial Public Insurance Produce Pareto Improvements? (National Bureau of 
Economic Research Working Paper Series Number 9035, Washington DC, 2002). 
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• Explicit contracts which are enforceable and thus provide greater certainty than a legislated 
benefit regime; 
• Decision-making is decentralised, and consumers receive the benefits of competition for 
market share among the competing providers; 
• Full funding of claims becomes more credible; 
• SOEs are subject to the Commerce Act 1986, Fair Trading Act 1986 and Consumer 
Guarantees Act 1993, so consumers have legal recourse for breach of contract or existing 
law. 
This model has implications for private providers in the insurance market.  Competition with 
SOEs is feasible where as it is impossible under the current regime.  The private insurers would 
have access to the 80 per cent of the personal risk market currently monopolised by the Accident 
Compensation Corporation.  The threat of the SOEs undertaking a broader range of business would 
be a competitive threat for the private providers. 
V CONCLUSIONS 
Accidents are just one component of the risk faced by individuals.  Separating accident 
insurance from the broader private insurance market raises costs that are ultimately borne by 
consumers.  In addition, the absence of consumer choice in respect of the insurer and the level of 
insurance cover (above the minimum level) raises the total cost of the full insurance cover required 
by individuals.  Monopoly provision reduces consumer welfare even when the monopoly is 
government owned.   
The current structure of the accident compensation scheme in New Zealand is inefficient: the 
perverse incentives and moral hazard problems associated with the scheme are illustrated by the 
differential between accident rates for employees and the self-employed in the same industries.  A 
scheme that allowed competing providers, and individual and group choice, and that addressed the 
incentives associated with current scheme, would deliver greater long-term benefits to all potential 
victims of accidents in New Zealand. 
